Horizontal and Vertical (Buyer-Supplier) Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment : Determinants of Malaysian Establishments' Total Factor Productivity by Khalifah, Noor Aini et al.
.. 
Session -C,S -36 
12th International Convention of the East Asian Economic Association 2-3 Oct 2010, Seoul 
Horizontal and Vertical (Buyer-Supplier) Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment: 
Determinants of Malaysian Establishments' Total Factor Productivity 
Noor Aini Khalifah* 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
Salmah Mohd Salleh 
Ministry of Education Malaysia 
Radziah Adam § 
Universiti Sains Malaysia 
Abstract 
This study examines the issue of indirect technology transfer through both horizontal and vertical 
spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI). Combining both input-output data for 2000 and 
a balanced micro-panel data set for the period 2000-2004, we estimate total factor productivity 
(TFP) of establishments as a function of the different extent of foreign presence and inter 
industry linkages; amongst other explanatory variables. All measures of fOlward linkages from 
FDI presence negatively affect TFP whereas the size of establishment positively affects TFP. 
However, alternative measures of horizontal and backward vertical spillovers from FDI reveal 
positive spillover effects exist only for wholly foreign-owned establishments affecting TFP 
positively. Government policies allowing for 100% foreign ownership in establishments that 
export greater than 80% of their output (so called "export-oriented industrialization") led to a 
proliferation of wholly foreign-owned establishments in the electrical and electronics sector in 
which production is relatively labor intensive leading to positive horizontal and vertical spillover 
effects in terms of backward linkages. Shared ownership (including local ownership), for 
instance, in the manufacture of chemical and refined petroleum products which is relatively 
capital intensive leads to positive backward vertical spillover and insignificant horizontal 
spillover when foreign ownership is weighted by capital. In cases of shared ownership, the 
spillover effects are detrimental or insignificant when foreign is weighted in terms of wages and 
output. Horizontal spillover effects are absent for domestic establishments although backward 
linkages are always positive and significant. The results suggest that factor propOltions or 
technological intensity of production as well as different weights used to measure the extent of 
foreign involvement in industries influences spillover effects and not just the degree of foreign 
ownership per se. 
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1. Introduction 
The World Investment RepOlt 2001 examines the role of linkages and emphasizes the 
importance of linkages in increasing the productivity of local firms in the developing countries. 
Linkages can be powerful channels for diffusing knowledge and skills between firms ' 
(UNCTAD, 2001: p. 129). More recently, many academic researchers seek to examine the 
impact of vertical spillovers on productivity of local firms given that the empirical evidence on 
horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) spillovers has produced mixed results with no strong 
consensus on the magnitudes and causality of FDI spillovers. In other words, researchers attempt 
to differentiate between vertical (inter-industry) spillovers in terms of backward and forward 
linkages and horizontal (intra-industry) FDI spillovers through the channels of competition and 
demonstration effects as well as mobility of labor. 
Vertical spillover from FDI is where foreign investors are linked to indigenous firms in 
the upstream and downstream industries. There is a possibility of domestic firms gaining 
technological benefits in the upstream and downstream industries in host countries (Kohpaiboon, 
2009). Multinational corporations (MNCs) have the incentive to transfer knowledge through 
vertical spillovers because of the demand for high quality inputs, on time delivery and after-
sales-service support (Javorcik, 2004). Backward linkages may be related to local firms 
providing intermediate goods to foreign firms and forward linkages relate to the production of 
MNC being used as intermediates by local firms (Barrios and Strobl, 2002). In this paper, we 
examine both horizontal and vertical spillover effects from FDI as determinants of total factor 
productivity (TFP) in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
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There is theoretical evidence that linkage is one of the channels of FDI spillovers 
(Smeets, 2008). Rodriguez-Clare (1996) states that the linkage effect of multinationals on the 
host country is more likely to be favorable when the goods that multinationals produce uses 
intermediate goods intensively. Therefore, there is a need to study vertical spillover of foreign 
and local establishments on local suppliers in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. Hence, this 
study attempts to carefully investigate the buyer-supplier linkages (veliical spillovers) by 
comparing the ownership structure of the Malaysian manufacturing sector. Ownership structure 
may be important in the context of formulating policies with respect to foreign equity ownership 
for MNCs in Malaysia (MIDA, 2008). 
Using establishment-level panel data for the period of 2000-2004, the study examines 
intra-industry (horizontal) spillovers and inter-industry (vertical) spillovers from foreign direct 
investment by comparing total factor productivity of both foreign and local establishments. In 
other words, this study examines differences in total factor productivity (TFP) behavior between 
local establishments and foreign-owned establishments. In particular, this paper contributes to 
the existing literature by analyzing the impact of different proxies of foreign presence measured 
in terms of wages, fixed assets and output and also three subsamples of establishments with 
different extents of foreign ownership: wholly foreign-owned establishments (100% foreign 
ownership), foreign establishments with other than 100% foreign ownership (both shared and 
local ownership) and local establishments (less than 10% foreign ownership). This study also 
analyzes the impact of vertical spillover on TFP and its policy implications. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses previous studies on vertical 
linkages and their determinants specifically in terms of the Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
Section 3 explains the data and methodology used for the analysis, followed by the presentation 
of the empirical results in Section 4. The conclusion appears in Section 5. 
2. Literature Review 
There are several studies that empirically investigate vertical spillovers from MNCs which 
transmit technology indirectly to local suppliers and customers. Javorcik (2004) analyzes 
productivity of about 4000 Lithuanian firms with the presence of multinationals in downstream 
sectors (customers - forward) and upstream industries (potential suppliers of intermediate inputs 
- backward). Javorcik (2004) finds evidence of positive productivity spillovers through backward 
linkages but not forward linkages as well as no evidence of intrasectoral spillovers. Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2008) also finds evidence of positive productivity spillovers through backward 
linkages for projects with shared domestic and foreign ownership but not for fully owned foreign 
subsidiaries for the period 1998-2003. Their result for the fully owned foreign subsidiaries in the 
upstream sector is negative and insignificant. When Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) consider 
intra-industry effects, the wholly owned foreign affiliates have a larger negative effect on the 
productivity growth of Romanian firms in the same sector than the paJtially owned FDI projects. 
Blalock and Gertler (2008) also find evidence of positive productivity spillovers through 
backward linkages in the Indonesian manufacturing sector and conclude that vertical supply 
chains are a conduit for technology transfer from FDI in emerging markets. 
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Spillovers from FDI may act as a substitute or complement to the productivity of the host 
country. A study by Kugler (2006) based on Colombian Manufacturing Census since 1974 until 
1998 finds that there is no diffusion of externalities within sectors but there is evidence of inter-
industry spillovers from FDI. In other words, the host country firms within the :MNC's sector 
experience limited productivity gains from FDI but host country producers in other sectors may 
benefit from FDI. The study by Kugler (2006) concludes that FDI act as a substitute for within-
sector (intra-industry) domestic investment but a complement for between sectors (inter-
industry) domestic investment. 
The effects of intra- and inter-industry buyer-supplier linkages have also been studied by 
Driffield et al. (2002, 2004). Driffield et al. (2002) finds evidence that domestic firms benefit 
from purchasing from multinationals in the same sector (intra-industry) and in other sectors 
(inter-industry). The domestic firms might be benefiting in terms of input attributes such as 
higher quality components, better technology and lower prices. Also, the domestic firms may be 
able to learn from the operational and managerial procedures adopted in foreign films . In the 
case where foreign firms buy from domestic suppliers, there are significant backward linkages in 
the same sector but not in other sectors. However, the backward linkages in the same sector has 
negative coefficient. In other words, intra-industry sales by domestic firms to foreign firms in the 
same industry seem to result in poorer domestic industry perfOlmance. Since UK has the inter-
regional input-output tables which not all countries have this benefit (for example, Malaysia) 
Driffield et al. (2004) study the intra- and inter-regional externalities from the presence of 
foreign manufacturing together with intra- and inter-industry buyer-supplier relationships in UK 
manufacturing sector. The findings of Driffield et al. (2004) for backward linkages are the same 
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as Driffield et al. (2002) except that the inter-industry spillovers in other region has significantly 
negative result and inter-industry in the region has insignificant negative result. Both Driffield et 
al. (2004) and Driffield et al. (2002) find evidence that domestic films benefit from purchasing 
from multinationals in the same industry and in other industries either in the same region or in 
other region except for the same industry in the same region and for different industries in 
different regions which are not significant but the coefficients are positive. The findings by 
Driffield et al. (2002, 2004) are different in the sense that the forward linkages increase the 
productivity of the local firms but the backward linkages do not enhance the productivity of the 
domestic firms. 
Bitzer et al. (2008) argue that research on vertical linkages generally use micro-level data 
for one particular country which is considered as case study and therefore it is difficult to 
generalize. Hence, Bitzer et al. (2008) examine vertical and horizontal linkages for 17 OEeD 
countries for the years 1989 to 2003 to arrive at more general conclusions on the impOltance of 
velticallinkages for productivity benefits from FDI. The study uses industry-level data from the 
OEeD STAN database combine with input-output tables for OEeD countries. Bitzer et al. 
(2008) find evidence of positive effects from horizontal FDI. There is also a statistically 
significant and positive spillover through backward linkages while there is no evidence of 
forward linkages . Bitzer et al. (2008) findings on backward linkages are consistent with the study 
of Javorcik (2004). The main conclusion from the study of Bitzer et al. (2008) is that the 
evidence for spillovers from backward linkages is indeed strong and there is evidence for 
spillovers through veltical backward linkages between multinationals and domestic firms. Bitzer 
et al. (2008) also find some evidence for positive horizontal effects from FDI. 
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Studies of FDI spillover effects on Malaysia as a host country and in particular veltical 
spillovers are quite limited (Iguchi, 2008). For example, Iguchi (2008) uses interviews to explore 
evidence of inter-organizational linkages between transnational corporation (TNC) subsidiaries 
and local suppliers in the Malaysian electrical and electronics industry. The study finds that 
characteristics of the subsidiaries such as autonomy, local sourcing rate and location are 
positively related to the intensity of backward linkages. Another study by Khalifah and Adam 
(2008) in the Malaysian electrical and electronic sector finds that wholly foreign -owned 
establishments have lower backward linkages with backward linkages measured as the share of 
intermediate inputs purchased locally (as opposed to imported inputs). Inward investment in 
terms of 100% foreign equity participation has a fairly low percentage of inputs sourced locally 
(Khalifah and Adam, 2008). Furthermore, Khalifah and Adam (2008) concludes that MNCs 
affiliates import intelmediate goods from overseas and assemble for exports instead of sourcing 
locally, thus there is no incentive for MNCs to transfer technology to local suppliers . 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Description 
The data set employed in this study is based on the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries, 
conducted by the Department of Statistics (DOS), Malaysia for the year 2000-2004 (annual 
surveys except for census conducted in 2000). The annual surveys cover all establishments above 
a specific employment cut-off, which vary from industry to industry. There are 192 industries at 
the five-digit level, classified under the Malaysian Standard Industrial Classification (MSIC), 
2000. 
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The principal statistics for each establishment compiled are type of ownership, foreign 
equity ownership, value of gross output, cost of inputs, value added, value of fixed assets and 
number of workers employed as well as the total wages paid during the year. Output is calculated 
as the value of sales less the change in inventories. Value added is taken to be the difference 
between the value of gross output and the cost of input. Capital stock is the stock of fixed assets 
rep011ed by each establishment at the end of the reference year. Wages are the amount paid by 
each establishment including the amount paid to the part-time workers during the reference year. 
All the data have been deflated using the appropriate deflators . The value of gross output and 
cost of inputs respectively have been deflated using the Producer Price Index (PPI) and an 
intermediate input deflator at the 5-digit MSIC. The value of fixed assets are deflated using the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator (Egger, 2000) while wages are deflated using the 
domestic economy PPI deflator. 
The initial data set ranges from 20,455 establishments in 2000; 13,934 establishments in 
2001; 13,482 establishments in 2002; 13,672 in 2003 and 12,451 establishments in 2004. Given 
that there are differences in the actual establishments sampled over the years, the selected sample 
for the final data set constitute of a balanced panel of 5329 establishments spanning over the 
period 2000-2004. In order to arrive at the 5329 establishments, we cleaned the data by 
eliminating the establishments with negative value added and those not being classified in the 
Input-Output (10) table (industry above MSIC 37000). Table 1 below shows the percentage of 
value added for the balanced panel to total value added of all establishments included in the 10 
table. 
Table 1: Percentage of Value Added for Sample Establishments 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total VA 
(establishments in 
10 table only -
RM'OOO) 
VA for balanced 
panel (5329 
establishments -
RM'OOO) 
% of VA 
90,444,797 
62,792,901 
69.4 
Note: VA = value added 
58,561 ,791 
48,918,392 
83.5 
Source: Authors ' calculations based on DOS data 
88,079,906 75 ,666,612 
65,176,239 582,638,833 
74.0 77.0 
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2004 
104,346,507 
73,083,979 
70.0 
Table 1 shows that the value added for the selected sample in this study ranges from 69.4% 
(during census year) to 83.5% of the total value added. We conclude that the selected sample is 
representative of the Malaysian manufacturing sector in terms of coverage of the value added. 
All of the establishments are also categorized according to the different ownership 
groups. Local establishments denote establishments with less than 10% foreign ownership while 
wholly foreign ownership are establishments with 100% foreign ownership. There is balanced 
panel of 412 establishments with 100% foreign ownership and 4752 establishments with foreign 
ownership not equal to 100% foreign ownership. Out of the 4752 establishments, a balanced 
panel of 4125 establishments are considered as local establishments i.e. less than 10% foreign 
ownership. 
3.2 Model Specification and Methodology 
We estimate a production function for a full sample of an unbalanced panel using the semi-
parametric approach suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) which corrects for endogeneity 
in determining inputs. This method addresses the issue of biasness in the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates of production functions . The production function is estimated in log-linear form 
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by taking log values for the dependent variable (gross output, Q) and explanatory variables 
(intermediate inputs, Z; fixed assets, FA; labor, WAGES). 
lnQ = f(lnZ, ln FA, ln WAGES) (1) 
Following Petrin et al. (2004), we calculate production functions for each industry at the 
MSIC 4-digit level using equation (1). Then, we estimate the TFP of each establishment which is 
the difference between actual output and predicted output (Javorcik, 2004, p. 619). After 
estimating the TFP, we then relate the TFP to the proxies of FDI participation which are the 
horizontal and vel1ical spillovers. Horizontal spillovers exist if domestic firms benefit from the 
presence of foreign films operating in the same industry. Meanwhile, the vertical spillovers exist 
if domestic firms benefit from the presence of foreign firms operating in the other industry either 
upstream or downstream. The analysis reveals the effect of changes in horizontal and vertical 
spillovers on estimates of establishment productivity over the period of 2000-2004. A positive 
contribution from horizontal and vertical spillovers suggests a transfer of technology within 
(intra-) and across (inter-) industries respectively. 
Adopting the specification (among others) by Javorcik (2004) and Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2008), the model used to examine FDI spillovers is specified as follows : 
(2) 
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where subscripts i, j and t index all establishments, 5-digit industry codes and years respectively, 
for the total sample of manufacturing establishments. The explanatory variables include proxies 
for spillovers from FDI operating through horizontal, backward and fOlward channels. The 
horizontal spillovers (HORIZONTALjt) at the industry level measure the extent of foreign 
presence within the same industry weighted by either output (Q), fixed assets (FA) or wages (W). 
(3) 
Establishment specific measure of horizontal spillovers HORIZONTALijt, is derived by 
subtracting each establishment's foreign share in sectoral output from the industry level measure 
HORIZONTALjt, again weighted by either output, fixed assets or wages. The HORIZONTALjt 
variable increases with increases in Q, FA or W in the establishment and also the foreign equity 
participation in the sector. 
On the other hand, the vertical spillovers measure the extent of backward (BACKWARD) 
and forward spillovers (FORWARD) in the upstream and downstream sectors, respectively. A 
linkage coefficient is calculated using the Input-Output (10) tables. In other words, to measure 
vertical linkages, the 10 tables for 2000 are used together with the establishment data from 
Depmtment of Statistics, Malaysia (DOS) for the years of 2000-2004. The MSIC 5-digit 
industries ' foreign share is calculated based on weights in terms of output, fixed assets and 
wages. The industry by industry transactions matrix is used to measure linkages between 
industries. The linkage intensities are derived by dividing industry group purchases/sales from/to 
each industry by total Malaysian intermediate purchases/sales. The total Malaysian intermediate 
12 
purchases/sales exclude imported inputs and payments to labor. The exclusion of imported inputs 
in Malaysian 10 table is in line with the suggestion by Javorcik (2004), that is, to use domestic 
intermediate inputs to measure linkages. The column vectors in the 10 table show the sector 
purchases and sector sales appear in the row vectors (Driffield et aI. 2002, p. 342). Ideally, in the 
estimation ofveliical spillovers, multiple 10 table for each corresponding year i.e. 10 table 2000 
for the data in year 2000, 10 table 2001 for the data in year 2001 and subsequently should be 
used. However, the latest 10 table produced by DOS at the time of this research is for the year 
2000. As a result, this study uses 10 table for 2000 and hold the linkage coefficients for veliical 
spillovers constant over the observation period (Bitzer et aI. , 2008). 
Following Javorcik (2004) and Blalock and Gertler (2008), backward linkages are 
defined as follows: 
BACKWARDj t = I a j k * HORIZONTAL kt. 
k ifk-;i:j (4) 
where ajk is the proportion of sector j's output supplied to sector k taken from Malaysian ' s Input-
Output table for the year 2000. Following Driffield et aI. (2002), the forward linkage variable for 
industry j is measured as follows : 
FO RHlARDjt = I 0jm * H ORIZO l',l TA4nt 
t i1 (int;!:. } 
where Jjm is the share of inputs in total inputs purchased by industry j from industry m. 
(5) 
Other determinants of establishments ' productivity include foreign share, labor quality, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and size of establishment. The foreign share (FOR) measures 
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the actual share of foreign equity of the establishments. Labor quality denoted by average wages 
per establishment (AVGW) measures the absorptive capability or human capital embodied in the 
local establishment (Kohpaiboon, 2009). In previous studies, Khalifah and Adam (2009) uses the 
ratio of white-collar workers to total workers to measure labor quality of an establishment. In 
cases where the establishment has one worker/owner, the ratio of white-collar workers to total 
number of workers will be unity, reflecting the highest labor quality possible for small 
establishments. In order to avoid this bias for small establishments, we measure the labor quality 
as the ratio of wages to total number of workers in each establishment (Aswicahyono and Hill , 
1995). In cases where part-time workers are hired, two part-time workers are considered to equal 
one full-time worker. HHI is used to measure the degree of market competition at the five-digit 
industry level in terms of value added. Higher value of HHI indicates higher degree of industry 
concentration and thus less competition. 
According to Biesebroeck (2005), large firms improve productivity faster while the 
smaller firms find difficulty in advancing in size or productivity distribution. This may be due to 
large firms experiencing economies of scale and are more likely to be self sufficient (Khalifah 
and Adam, 2008). Thus a positive relationship is expected between establishment size and 
productivity. In this study, SIZE is measured as establishment value added normalized by 
average value added for the respective industries. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
A summary of the data classified according to 2-digit MSIC for the Malaysian manufacturing 
sector in the year 2004 is provided in Table 2. Approximately one-third of Malaysia's 
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manufacturing output was produced by 248 wholly owned foreign establishments in the 
electrical and electronic sector. These wholly foreign-owned establishments also produced 28% 
of Malaysia ' s manufacturing value added, employed 20% of the total number of workers, paid 
22% of the total wages in the manufacturing sector but only utilized 11.7% of the fixed assets in 
the manufacturing sector, resulting in a capital labor (KlL) ratio of212.0 against the KlL ratio of 
263.0 and 239.1 for establishments with shared and local ownership respectively in the electrical 
and electronics sector. 
The maID econometric results of this study of the determinants of TFP, for the overall 
manufacturing sector and the sub-sample of wholly foreign-owned establishment are shown in 
Table 31• Models 1 A to 1 F of Table 3 shows both FOR (percentage foreign equity in an 
establishment) and D 100 (dummy for wholly foreign-owned establishment) are not significant 
i.e. neither actual foreign equity share nor wholly foreign ownership are significant in explaining 
TFP. As for other explanatory variables, SIZE and labor quality (AVGW) are significant and 
positively affect TFP while market concentration (HHI) is significant and negatively affect TFP. 
We find no evidence of significant horizontal spillover for the main variables of interest both in 
terms of FPW and FPQ. The findings of this current study are consistent with those of Javorcik 
(2004) who found no evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. However, there is a positive and 
significant horizontal spillover in terms of FP FA. This result is consistent with the empirical 
study on spillovers of Khalifah and Adam (2009) on Malaysia using labor productivity as the 
dependent variable. 
I The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is significant (p =0.0000) and Hausman test is also significant 
(p=O.OOOO) and thus indicate that the fixed effects model is the best model selected compared with pooled least 
squares and random effects. 
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Table 2: Summary of Malaysian Manufacturing Sector for the Year 2004 
DIG2++ O/ship # Estb. %Q %VA % WAGES %FA %L KlL AvgW QIK Q/L 
15,16 Who 40 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 821.2 76.1 5.5 1,693.1 
Join. 109 1.8 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.2 209.1 33.4 8.7 872.1 
Loc. 2116 7.4 5.0 5.8 5.7 7.6 174.3 24.7 6.4 565.8 
17, 18, 19 Who 50 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.4 1.2 108.5 42.8 14.4 418.9 
Join. 62 0.9 1.0 1.7 2.1 2.2 292. 1 48.3 8.0 452.6 
Loc. 1268 0.8 1.1 2.4 1.0 3.7 101.7 36.6 9.2 267.2 
20,21,22 Who 70 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.3 222.3 44.0 6.3 491.4 
Join. 99 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.7 372.8 61.2 5.6 612.1 
Loc. 1521 3.5 4.7 7.5 7.2 9.3 346.4 50.4 4.8 475.2 
23,24 Who 65 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.6 304.5 34.9 2.5 747.5 
Join. 130 9.3 10.8 2.8 20.5 1.2 10,672.2 113.3 3.0 17,678.0 
Loc. 372 6.1 6.7 3.0 10.3 1.9 1,820.2 66.2 7.4 8,738.0 
25 Who 117 1.1 1.4 2.3 1.3 2.6 59.7 16.1 2.7 158.4 
Join. 162 1.2 1.2 2.3 1.7 2.6 77.5 16.2 2.2 170.9 
Loc. 782 2.6 2.5 5.1 2.9 6.3 55.5 14.5 2.8 153.9 
26 Who 37 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 178.7 24.2 1.9 332.1 
Join. 40 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.5 218.7 21.8 1.2 260.0 
Loc. 576 1.6 2.4 2.7 4.4 2.6 202.0 19.0 1.1 232.1 
27,28 Who 92 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 255.1 45.7 5.9 754.3 
Join. 137 1.9 1.2 2.0 2.0 1.5 316.5 46.9 6.2 963.0 
Loc. 1433 3.3 3.2 4.9 4.9 4.6 328.0 40.5 4.5 660.9 
29 Who 59 1.1 1.5 1.4 0.8 1.0 96.3 27.4 4.7 448.0 
Join. 39 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.5 53.2 26.6 8.1 428.8 
Loc. 576 0.9 1.6 1.8 0.8 1.7 52.7 19.2 3.8 200.8 
30,31,32 Who 248 32.9 28 .0 22.0 11.7 19.6 212.0 59.4 26.2 1,916.4 
Join. 88 2.0 2.4 3.2 2.8 2.8 263.0 60.2 22.2 1,045.1 
Loc. 282 6.9 6.8 6.6 3.2 5.9 239. 1 59.7 40.1 4,005.7 
33 Who 24 1.0 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.5 40.3 19.6 6.5 262.5 
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OJG2++ O/ship # Estb. %Q %VA % WAGES %FA %L K/L AvgW QIK Q/L 
Join. 5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 52.2 19.6 3.8 195.6 
Loc. 19 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 27.2 15.3 13 .8 374.8 
34 Who 10 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 58.3 17.1 3.2 185.0 
Join. 27 3.1 2.1 2.0 2.6 1.6 202.6 22.7 3.7 753.3 
Loc. 172 0.9 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.3 77.5 18.4 3.5 268.8 
35 Who 8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 54.1 18.1 6.9 372.6 
Join . 22 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 133.1 22.2 3.6 477.6 
Loc. 136 0.5 0.9 1.7 0.7 1.4 60.4 22.4 2.4 144.2 
36,37 Who 60 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.3 1.0 115.6 25.6 9.0 586.9 
Join. 58 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.7 47.5 14.7 2.9 138.8 
Loc. 1095 1.3 1.6 3.3 1.5 4.7 96.1 27.5 7.4 371.2 
%TOT. Who 7.2 41.2 37.6 34.3 20.2 31.4 77.5 19.8 6.5 500.0 
MFG. Join. 8.0 22.6 24.2 19.4 36.3 17. 1 256.0 20.6 2.0 503.3 
Loc. 84.8 36.2 38.2 46.3 43.5 51.5 101.7 16.3 2.6 267.3 
RM'mil.+ Total 12,206 506.9 104.4 24.2 160.4 1.3 120.4 18.2 3.2 380.7 
Notes: 
Who = wholly (100% foreign ownership), Join = joint (I O%:sforeign ownership:S99%), Loc = local (less than 10% foreign ownership); 
# Estb. = No. of establishments. 
+ In the last line of the table, # of establishment shows actual number and labor shows number of workers in millions with 2 part-time workers equivalent to I 
full -time worker. 
++OIG2 refers to two digit industries with 15, 16 - Food, Beverages, Tobacco; 17, 18, 19 - Textiles, Apparels, Footwear, Leather; 20, 21, 22 - Wood, Paper, 
Publishing; 23, 24 - Chemical, Petroleum; 25 - Rubber, Plastic; 26 - Glass; 27, 28 - Iron, Metal; 29 - Machinery; 30, 3 I ,32 - Electrical, Electronics; 33 -
Medical, Photographic; 34 - Automotive; 35 - Ship, Aircraft; 36, 37 -Furniture, Waste, Scrap 
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In the last three columns of Table 3 (models 2A-2C), the sub-sample of wholly foreign 
ownership (balanced panel=412), FOR equals to 100%, shows there is positive and significant 
evidence of horizontal spillovers for all proxies. As we already noted in Table 2, the wholly 
foreign establishments are mostly establishments in the electrical and electronic (E&E) 
industries. These establishments in the E&E sector that are wholly foreign-owned tend to be 
more labor-intensive in their production and are mostly for exp0l1-promotion (EP) compared to 
import substitution (IS) industries where the latter are more capital intensive such as the 
automobile and steel industry. At the same time, there are significant positive backward linkages 
and negative fOlward linkages for all proxies in the overall manufacturing and wholly foreign-
owned sub-sample. 
Our main variable of interest in terms of backward linkages, BWINTER, BFAINTER and 
BQINTER respectively, representing foreign equity weighted in terms of wages, fixed assets and 
output shows significant positive productivity spillovers arising from contacts between foreign 
customers and domestic suppliers in the different industries in the 10 table. The forward linkage 
variable, FWINTER, FF AINTER and FQINTER where foreign presence is respectively weighted 
by wages, fixed assets and output shows a significant negative sign. This result is consistent in 
both the overall sample and sub-sample of wholly foreign-owned establishment. This finding is 
similar to that of Javorcik (2004). A plausible explanation is that higher foreign presence in 
industries where locals are using the inputs of foreign suppliers result in higher prices of inputs 
due to higher technology embodied in the inputs but that this technology does not benefit the 
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Table 3: Regression Results of Productivity Determinants 
ALL ESTABLISHMENTS Sub-sample: WHOLLY, FOR= 100% 
FE FE 
IA IB IC ID IE IF 2A 2B 2C 
Dep. Var. TFP (Levinsohn Petrin productivity estimator) 
C 3.10 3.12 3.11 3.09 3.11 3.11 3.71 3.99 3.92 
(118.71)- (125.50)" (130.56)' (120.57)' (127.74)" (133 .08), (25.43)' (28.66)' (29.68}" 
FOR -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
(-1.21) (-1.34) (-1.24) 
DIOO -0.06 -0.07 -007 
(-1.48) (-1.58) (-1.56) 
BWINTER 0.000024 0.000024 0.0000412 
(7.57)- (7.58)- (4.25)" 
FWINTER -0.0000599 -00000598 -0.0000921 
(-13.45)' (- 13.44)· (-8.95)' 
FPWINTRA 0.05 0.05 1.33 
(0.99) (0.98) (6.17)a 
BFA INTER 0.00000395 0.00000395 0.00000577 
(5 .99)- (6.00)" (2.57)b 
FFAINTER -000000696 -0.00000695 -0.00000771 
( -8.36)a (-8.35)a (-3.57)' 
FPFAINTRA 0.09 0.09 0.68 
(2.07)b (2.06)b (3.70)' 
BQINTER 0.00000087 0.000000872 0.00000139 
(8.53)a (8.54)a ( 487)a 
FQINTER -0.00000238 -0.00000237 -0.00000345 
( -13.36)a (_13.35)a (-8.48)-
FPQINTRA 0.04 0.04 0.81 
(0.87) (0.87) (416)' 
HHI -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -1.77 -1.68 -1.78 
(-2.69)- (-2.87)a (-2.85)· (-2.67)' (-2.87)- (-2.84)a ( -6.08)- (-5.58)- (-6.00)' 
SIZE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(7 73)a (7.91 )a (778)· (7.74)a (7.92)a (7.78)a (2.40)b (2.12)b (2.17)b 
AVGW 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 
(2.27)b (2.25)b (2.20)b (2.29)b (2.26)b (2.22)b (0.24) (0.18) (0.13) 
R2 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Adiusted R" 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Cross section 5329 5329 5329 5329 5329 5329 412 412 412 
Balanced 26645 26645 26645 26645 26645 26645 2060 2060 2060 
Observations 
Notes: a, band c denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, with t-statistics in parentheses. FE denotes fixed effects. 
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locals and thus not commensurate with the higher cost (see Javorcik, 2004). SIZE as usual 
positively affects TFP. Market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) negatively affects TFP for both the overall sample as well as sub-sample of wholly 
foreign-owned establishments. However, we find a non-significant coefficient for labor quality 
in equations 2A, 2B and 2C of Table 3. In other words, labor quality (AVGW) is not significant 
in explaining TFP in the wholly foreign-owned establishments. A possible explanation for this 
result is that wholly foreign-owned establishments are interested in the location advantages in 
Malaysia especially that of cheap labor relative to the ownership or internalization advantage of 
FDI in Dunning's (1977) OLI framework. 
Next, we examine the issue of whether joint ownership between locals and foreign lead to 
greater linkages compared to wholly foreign-owned establishments. Table 4 presents the results 
of regressing the same model with sub-sample for all the other establishments (both foreign and 
domestic) excluding the wholly foreign-owned establishments (FOR= 100%). The first three 
columns of Table 4 (models 3A-3C) show FOR is not significant for establishments other than 
100% foreign equity (balanced panel=4752). As for the other variables, SIZE and AVGW are 
both positive and significant in affecting TFP. One interesting finding is that market 
concentration is also positive and significant. The results of sub-samples of establishments with 
joint foreign and local ownership (models 3A-3C, Table 4) or local ownership only (models 4A-
4C, Table 4) indicate that in more concentrated industries where there is imperfect competition 
among establishments; the productivity of the establishments increase with market power. These 
results are contrary to the results for all establishments and wholly foreign-owned sub-sample (in 
Table 3). In other words, the result for the overall sample is being "driven" by the negative sign 
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T b l 4 R a e egressIon R It fP d t' 'ty D t t fi S b esu so ro uc IV] e ermman s or u -SampJe 
Sub-sample: FOR not 100% Sub-sample: Domestic (FOR < 10% ) 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Dep. Var. TFP (Levinsohn Petrin productivity estimator) 
3.03 3.03 3.04 2.96 2.96 2.98 
C (119.30)" (125 .24)" (129.84)" (117.98), (122 .55)' (127.77)' 
0.02 0.01 0.02 
FOR (0.25) (0.16) (0.23) 
0.0000041 0.00000932 
BWINTER (1.19) (2.60)b 
-0.0000215 -0.0000289 
FWINTER (-3.56)" (-4.1 0)" 
-0.12 -0.08 
FPWINTRA (-2.43)b t1.44) 
0.00000122 0.00000207 
BFAINTER (1.76)b (2.82)' 
-0.00000625 -0.00000584 
FFAINTER (-606)' (-4.91)' 
0.01 0.05 
FPFAINTRA (0.3 1) (1.11) 
0.000000051 0.000000306 
BOINTER (0.44) (2.45)b 
-0.000000862 -0.00000122 
FQINTER (-3.54)' (-4.34)' 
-0.10 -0.07 
FPQINTRA (-2.02)b (-1.38) 
0.19 0. 14 0.18 0.04 -0.003 0.03 
HHI (2.52)b (1.87)b (2.20)b (0.54) (-0.03) (0.37) 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.006 
SIZE (7.34)' (7.56)' (7.37)" (5 .02)' (5 .22)' (5.01)' 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
AVGW (2.70)b (2.74)b (2.74)b (129) 0.30) (130) 
R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Adjusted R" 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Cross section 4752 4752 4752 4125 4125 4125 
Balanced 23,760 23,760 23,760 20,625 20,625 20,625 
Observations 
Note: a, band c denote slgmficant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, with t-statlstJcs In parentheses, 
of the w h o lly foreign-owned sub-sample for the HHlvariable where in the wholly owned foreign 
sub-sample higher industrial concentration leads to "complacency" and lower TFP, 
The main variables of interest in models 3A and 3C of Table 4 show negative and 
significant h orizontal spi llovers using both proxies of wages and output. However, th ere is no 
evidence of h orizontal spillovers in t enns of fixed assets in this su b-sample of j o int and local 
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ownership. This is in contrast with both the all establishments and wholly foreign-owned sub-
sample (in Table 3) where there is insignificant horizontal spillover effect when foreign is 
weighted in terms of wages and output. Another important finding is that we still find negative 
and significant forward linkages for all proxies for sub-sample other than 100% foreign equity 
share. However, there is only positive and significant veltical spillover for backward linkages 
where foreign is weighted in terms of fixed assets (model 3B, Table 4) but not when foreign is 
weighted in terms of wages and output. There exists backward linkage in the sub-sample other 
than wholly foreign-owned establishments when "foreignness" is denoted in terms of fixed 
assets. When foreign is weighted by wages and output, there is no significant backward spillover 
effect. 
The results for sub-sample of domestic establishments only in models 4A-4C, Table 4 
(with FOR<IO%, balanced panel = 4125) shows that there is no evidence of positive horizontal 
spillovers. However, there are significant evidences of positive backward linkages and negative 
forward linkages for all proxies. Both market concentration and labor quality are not significant 
in explaining productivity of domestic establishments. However, SIZE is still positive and 
significant. The positive effect of size on TFP reflects the ability of large establishments to 
increase TFP or that scale economies generates productivity. 
One unanticipated finding is that labor quality proxied by average wages in Table 4 for 
sub-sample FOR-not-lOO percent is positive and significant for all three measures of foreign 
presence. However, for wholly foreign-owned enterprises labor quality is not significant (Table 
3). As mentioned earlier the result may indicate that the assembly operations of plants operating 
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with 'cheap labor' are driving this result. Average wages can also be used to denote absorptive 
capabilities of workers. In wholly foreign-owned establishments, absorptive capability does not 
affect TFP akin to that of domestic establishments. Thus the result for the overall sample that 
higher labor quality affects TFP is being driven by the sample of foreign establishments with 
joint ownership. 
Intra-industry spillovers measured in terms of wages (FPW) and output (FPQ) for 
establishments not 100% foreign ownership (FOR-nat-lOa), negatively affects TFP while 
horizontal spillovers measured in terms of fixed assets (FP FA) are not significant. This finding 
may suggest some market stealing effect from foreign presence or crowding out effect for FPW 
and FPQ. This result for the sub-sample not wholly foreign-owned contrasts that of 
establishments with wholly foreign 100% ownership (FORlOO), where in the latter FPW and 
FPQ positively affect TFP and FPFA is also positive and significant. Therefore, the negative for 
FOR-nat-lOa and positive for FORlOO offset each other leaving it being not significant for the 
overall sample for FPW and FPQ. The positive and significant coefficient of FPFA for the 
overall sample is the result from FORlOO being significant for the wholly foreign-owned sub-
sample and FPFA not significant from the sub-sample of FOR-nat-lOa. For the local sub-sample 
there is no horizontal spillover effects for foreign presence in an industry irrespective of the 
proxies used in measuring "foreignness". 
Based on these results, we conclude that if "foreignness" is denoted in terms of fixed 
assets, then there exist positive backward linkages and negative forward linkage and horizontal 
spillovers for the overall sample and sub-sample of wholly foreign-owned establishments. In the 
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sub-sample FOR-not-lOO, backward linkages are insignificant when foreign is weighted in terms 
of wages and output and significant and positive when "foreignness" is denoted in terms of 
capital. Spillovers from foreign presence within an industry are negative and significant when 
foreign is weighted in terms of wages and output and insignificant when weighted in terms of 
capital. In the case of domestic establishments, there are significant positive spillovers from 
backward linkages, negative spillovers from forward linkages, and the absence of horizontal 
spillovers. Another robust result is that SIZE positively influences TFP in all the sub-samples as 
well as overall sample. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has examined empirically FDI spillovers as the determinants of productivity in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector. Using a balanced panel data set for the years 2000-2004, size of 
establishments is found significant in determining TFP. This indicates there are scale economies 
for all establishments, foreign and local. All forward linkages negatively affect TFP. The result 
for forward linkages and size are robust for the overall sample and sub-samples categorized 
according to the extent of foreign ownership. The local sub-sample has the most observations but 
three variables are not significant i.e. horizontal or intra-industry spillovers, market concentration 
and labor quality. It is interesting that labor quality does not affect TFP of local establishments 
akin to that of wholly foreign owned establishments. 
The initial result shows there is significant and positive backward linkages for the overall 
sample, the wholly foreign-owned sub-sample and the domestic establishments sub-sample for 
all three measurements of FDI spillovers i.e . labor (wages), capital (fixed assets) and output. 
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Backward linkages for the sub-sample of joint ownership (including domestic ownership) shows 
insignificant backward vertical spillovers when foreign presence in the purchasing industries 
supplied by locals is measured in terms of wages and output. When "foreignness" is associated 
with capital and embodiment of "technology" in capital, then backward spillovers occur when 
foreign purchasers demand "high-quality" intermediate products from local suppliers. 
The intuition for this result can be grasped by looking at the bottom of Table 2. The 
sample of establishments with shared ownership uses 36% of capital and pays 19% of wages and 
produces 23% of gross output respectively of the manufacturing sector rendering production 
more capital intensive than wholly foreign-owned establishments using 20% of capital, paying 
34% of wages and producing 41 % of output of the manufacturing sector. The results on the 
presence or absence of vertical and horizontal spillover effects are sensitive to the degree of 
foreign ownership in a non-linear fashion in the establishments. The production process in 
wholly foreign-owned establishments is labor intensive generating positive backward linkages 
and intra-industry spillovers and negative forward linkages. The electrical and electronic sector 
with a proliferation of wholly foreign -owned establishments can be considered as labor intensive 
or less technology intensive sector with absorptive capacity or labor quality not influencing TFP. 
Higher industry concentration or market power reduces productivity in the less technology 
intensive sector. 
Higher industrial concentration and higher labor quality enhances TFP in establishments 
with joint ownership. This result supports the usual perception that market power cUl1ails 
competition and enhances profits and TFP. Overall the negative RRI sign for the total sample is 
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being driven by wholly foreign-owned establishments indicating that foreign establishments are 
being complacent with increasing market power or negative competitive effect. 
In the case of shared ownership, horizontal spillovers are non-existent when foreign 
presence is measured in terms of capital. However, horizontal spillovers are negative and 
significant when foreign presence is measured in terms of wages and output. Crowding out or 
market stealing effect occurs when foreign is weighted in terms of wages and output. Also, in 
FOR-not-IOO, absorptive capacity (labor quality) measured in terms of average wages is 
important in determining TFP. In the sub-sample of wholly foreign-owned establishments, intra-
industry spillovers are positive for all proxies of foreign presence. In the sub-sample of domestic 
establishments, there does not exists any horizontal spillover effect. In the overall sample, the 
results are an "aggregation" of the results for the different sub-samples - foreign presence within 
an industry positively influences TFP when weighted in terms of capital and insignificant when 
weighted in terms of wages and output. Similarly, in the overall sample, labor quality is 
significant in determining establishment TFP thanks to the establishments with joint ownership. 
Previous policies of the Malaysian government allowing for 100% foreign ownership in 
establishments that export greater than 80% of their output (the so called export-oriented 
industrialization) led to a proliferation of wholly foreign-owned establishments in the E&E 
sector in which production is relatively labor intensive (probably assembly activities). If we 
assume that wholly foreign-owned establishments reflect that of the electrical and electronic 
sector which is labor intensive or less technology intensive, then there are positive backward 
linkages and intra-industry spillovers and negative forward linkages irrespective of the weights 
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used in measuring foreign participation. The results suggest that both horizontal and backward 
vertical spillovers exist in industries with a lower technological sophistication. 
If we assume shared ownership reflects the chemical and petroleum sector, then there are 
insignificant backward linkages weighted in terms of wages and output and positive backward 
linkages when foreign is weighted in terms of capital. The chemical and petroleum industries are 
highly capital intensive (and resource intensive, especially for petroleum) sectors and can be 
regarded as the offspring of the import-substitution industrialization phase in Malaysia'S 
development. Foreign presence within industries measured in terms of capital has insignificant 
effects on TFP suggesting that local establishments do not have the capacity to imitate the 
foreign capital-intensive technology. Moreover, foreign presence within industries weighted by 
wages and output "squeezes" the establishments in technology or capital intensive sectors. Thus, 
it is the factor proportions or technological intensity in production in the different industries as 
well as different proxies for foreign involvement that influence horizontal and vertical spillovers 
from FDI together with labor quality, size and market structure that jointly determine TFP for the 
overall sample and not just the extent of foreign ownership per se. 
Variable 
Productivity (Q) -
dependent variable 
Fixed Assets/Capital (FA) 
Labor (WAGES) 
Intermediate inputs (Z) 
Horizontal spillover-
Foreign Presence: 
(FPQINTRA, FPFAINTRA, 
FPWINTRA) 
Vertical spillover 
(Q/W AGES/FA): 
BQINTERI 
BWINTERI 
BFAINTERI 
FQINTERI 
FWINTERI 
FFAINTER 
Market Concentration 
(HHI) 
Establishment Size (SIZE) 
Labor quality (AVGW) 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Definition of Variables 
Definition 
Real output in terms of gross output of each establishment 
(RM'OOO). 
Value of fixed assets or capital stock at year end (net of 
depreciation) (RM'OOO). 
Total wages paid during the year (RM'OOO). 
Total intermediate inputs reported during the year (RM'OOO). 
Extent of foreign presence proxied by gross output (Q), 
capital (FA) or wages (W) shares of foreign equity to total 
gross output, capital or wages respectively of the industry. 
Backward and forward spillover measured in terms of gross 
output (Q) OR fixed assets (FA) OR wages (WAGES). 
BQINTER = Backward measured in terms of gross output. 
BWAGESINTER = Backward measured in terms of wages 
paid during the year. 
BF AINTER = Backward measured in terms of value of fixed 
assets at year end (net of depreciation). 
FQINTER = Forward measured in telms of gross output. 
FWAGESINTER = Forward measured in terms of wages paid 
during the year. 
FFAINTER = Forward measured in telms of value of fixed 
assets at year end (net of depreciation). 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for each industry is 
calculated as the sum of squared market shares (in terms of 
value added) of all establishments in an industry, i.e . 
=:E i (VAi / VAji 
where i indicates establishment and j indicates the 5-digit 
industry classification. A scale of zero to one, where a unit 
value is obtained in the case of a monopoly. 
Value added (VA) of each establishment divided by industry 
average value added (VAi / VAj). 
The ratio of wages to total workers in each establishment. 
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a e ta IS lca T bl A2 S f f IS ummary 0 e ey ana es u fth K V . bI (F 11 I ) sampe 
Std. 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Dev. Observations 
FOR 0.15 0 1 0 0.328 26645 
BWINTER 4766 2300 27 148 0.611 6104.9 26645 
FWINTER 1242 570.62 32346 5.48 3157.3 26645 
BFAINTER 20085 10406.9 122274 2.93 25370 26645 
FFAINTER 9926 5099.62 148600 47.l8 16627 26645 
BQINTER 112038 56242.46 660740 9.13 145583 26645 
FQINTER 2955 1 14392.56 761958 121.92 69823 26645 
FPQINTRA 0.282 0.245 0.997 0 0.2 12 26645 
FPWINTRA 0.260 0.225 0.997 0 0.l99 26645 
FPFAINTRA 0.274 0.232 0.995 0 0.2 16 26645 
AVGW 14.l4 12.5 86 162.73 0 9.838 26645 
HHI 0.l007 0.058 0.955 0.006 0.11 2 26645 
SIZE 1.714 0.487 431.40 6.26E-06 5.l86 26645 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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Table A3: Correlation matrix of the Variables 
BW- FW- BFA- FFA - BQ- FQ- FPQ- FPW- FPFA - LN- LN- TFP-
FOR INTER INTER INTER INTER INTER INTER INTRA INTRA INTRA AVGW HHI SIZE LNO WAGES FA LNZ LP DlOO 
FOR 1.00 
BWINTER 0.[6 1.00 
FWINTER 0.25 0.08 1.00 
BFA INTER 0.[4 0.97 0.07 1.00 
FFAINTER 0.3[ 0.[7 0.90 0.[8 1.00 
BOINTER 0.20 0.97 0.[4 0.94 0.26 1.00 
FOINTER 0.25 0.[2 0.98 0.[2 0.9[ 0.[7 1.00 
FPOINTRA 0.30 0.26 0.37 0.22 0.4[ 0.32 0.36 1.00 
FPWINTRA 0.33 0.24 0.40 0.[9 0.45 0.29 0.39 0.96 1.00 
FPFAINTRA 0.28 0.24 0.35 0.20 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.94 0.93 1.00 
AVGW 0.3[ 0.20 0.[ 0 0.2[ 0.[5 0.2[ 0.13 0.[ 3 0.[4 0.09 1.00 
HHI 0.04 -0.0[ 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.0[ 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.09 1.00 
-
SIZE 0.[6 -0.0[ 0.00 -OO[ 0.00 -0.0[ 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.22 0.02 1.00 
LNO 0.44 0.[6 0.22 0.[8 0.32 0.[9 0.25 0. [7 0.20 0.[4 0.62 0.0[ 0.33 1.00 
-
LNWAGES 0.3 [ 0.[ [ 0.[5 0.[ [ 0.2[ 0.13 0.[7 O[ [ 0.[3 0.08 0.52 0.0[ 0.23 0.75 1.00 
LNFA 0.35 0.[5 0.[4 0.[6 0.22 0.[7 0.[7 0.[2 0.[4 0.[0 0.54 0.0[ 0.27 0.84 0.68 1.00 
LNZ 0.43 0.[5 0.2[ 0.[7 0.3[ 0.[8 0.24 0.[5 0.[9 0.[ 3 0.60 0.00 0.32 0.99 0.73 0.83 1.00 
TFPLP 0.[5 0.[ 3 -O.O[ 0.10 0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.[7 0.2[ 1.00 
DlOO 0.84 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.29 0.[8 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.02 0.[2 0.34 0.23 0.26 0.33 0.[2 1.00 
Source: Authors' computatIOns. 
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3. Kazunobu Hayakawa 
4. Chin Hee Hahn 
CSI-B ADB Session: Financial Globalization 
Chair: Jong Wha Lee 
I. Hiro Ito and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara: An Analysis of the Effects of Financial Market Imperfections on Indian 
Firms' Exporting Behavior 
2. Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park: Interational reserves and Swap Lines: Substitutes or 
Complements? 
3. AriefRamayandi: The Impact of Financial Shocks on Small, Open Economies: The Case of 4 ASEAN 
Countries 
4. Cyn-Young Park: Managing Capital flows in Asia: Issues and Policy Challenges for Emerging Asia 
5. Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista, Juthatip Jongwanich, and Jong Wha Lee: How Effective are Capital 
Controls in Asia? 
Discussants: 
1. Shahid Ahmed 
2. John Junggun Oh 
3. Eiji Ogawa 
4. Hyoungsik Noh 
5. Kian-Teng Kwek 
CSI -C Poverty and Income Distribution 
Chair: Fernando Aldaba 
I. Tamgid Ahmed Chowdhury and Pundarik Mukhopadhaya: Efficiency of Service Providers in Poverty 
Alleviation Programs in Bangladesh and their Gender bias 
3. Joseph J. Capuno and Marian Panganiban: From Devolution to Consolidation: Local Health Systems 
Arrangements and Maternal and Child Health Indicators an the Philippine 
4. Keisuke Okada: HIV/AIDS, fertility and child health in Cambodia 
Discussants: 
1. Marian Panganiban 
2. Keisuke Okada 
3. Yun Jeong Choi 
4. Saki Sugano 
CS3-D Labor Economics 
Chair: Manabu Fujimura 
1. Xiling WU: The Quantitative Analysis of the Changes in the Labour Market in Sichuan after the Earthquake 
2. Kampon Adireksombat, Zheng Fang, and Chris Sakellariou: The Evolution of Gender Wage Differentials and 
Discrimination in Thailand, 1991 -2007 -An Application of Unconditional Quantile Regression 
3. Fengliang LI, ZHAO Yandong, and J. W. MORGAN: Job Search Intensity, Cost and Outcome: Evidences 
from the Job Market for Post-graduate Students in China 
4. Tae Hoon KIM: Signaling Effect of Layoffs in Korea: An Empirical Analysis 
Discussants: 
I. Fengliang LI 
2. Sungho RHO 
3. Masakazu Hojo 
4. Bienvenido S. Cortes 
CS3-E International Investment and Capital Flows 
Chair: Eiji Ogawa 
I. Shu-Fei Yang and Kun-Ming Chen: The Impact of Outward Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic R&D 
Activity: Cost-saving versus Technology-sourcing 
2. Radziah Adam, Noor Aini Khalifah, and Salmah Mohamad Salleh: Horizontal and Vertical (Buyer-Supplier) 
Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment: Determinants of Malaysian Establishments" Total Factor 
Productivity 
3. Phanhpakit Onphanhdala and Terukazu SURUGA: Assessing the Impact ofFDI and the Investment Climate 
in Lao PDR 
Discussants: 
I. Mitsuyo Ando 
2. Shu-Fei Yang 
3. Nadia Doytch 
CS3-F NIDA and University of Antwerp Session on Economic Integration 
Chair: Ludo Cuyvers 
I. Ludo Cuyvers, Reth Soeng, Joseph Plasmans, Daniel Van Den Bu1cke: Productivity Spillovers from Foreign 
Direct Investment in the Cambodian Manufacturing Sector: Evidence from Establishment-Level Data 
2. Ludo Cuyvers and Reth Soeng: The Impact of the EU Generalized System of Preferences on Exports and 
GSP Utilization by Asian and Latin American Countries 
3. Sasatra Sudsawasd: Regional Trade Integration in East Asia: Gravity Model Applications 
4. Santi Chaisrisawatsuk: After ASEAN FT A, How Integrated WeAre 
Discussants: 
I. Tze-Haw CHAN 
2. Donghyun PARK 
3. Toshiyuki MATSUURA 
4. Chee-Wooi HOOY 
CS3-G Exchange Rates 
Chair: Kiyotaka Sato 
I. Sovannroeun Samreth: Empirical Studey on the Hysteresis of Currency Substitution in Cambodia 
2. Craig Parsons: Marston (1990) redux in Japanese autos at the retail level: How much Pricing-to-Market is 
really going on? 
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